# Strongmen in Need of Help:

# Peacekeeping and Personalist Regimes

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30 June 2025

Working paper, currently under review. Feel free to reach out to via email.

The authors acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation (SES # 2049443, Integrative International Interventions: Militant Violence and Human Security in Contemporary Conflicts). Special thanks to Lisa Hultman for allowing us to use the peacekeeping data. Thanks to Simon Hug for his detailed comments on an earlier draft and to participants at APSA 2025. We also thank Sam Sharman for his helpful feedback at multiple points during drafting. All errors are our own.

**Abstract**

Who accepts international actors to deal with domestic security problems? Using the framework of sovereignty costs and security benefits, we argue that personalist dictatorships are more likely to accept a UN peacekeeping operation than other regime types. In terms of security benefits, personalist leaders gain by having internal stability provided by peacekeeping. These regimes often face a unique threat environment that drives them to seek outside options to aid with their domestic security. At the same time, personalists experience relatively fewer sovereignty costs than other regimes. Since personalists must appease fewer domestic constituencies, they are more easily able to cede some decision-making autonomy to international peacekeepers. We find support for our arguments by utilizing regime classifications (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a) and data on United Nations peacekeeping from 1990 to 2010. The result has implications for the likely success of a peacekeeping operation and the erosion of the multilaterally enforced liberal international order.

**Keywords:** third-party interventions, civil conflicts, peacekeeping, personalist regimes

# 1 Introduction

Laurent Gbagbo came to power in 2000, ending one-party rule in Côte d'Ivoire. After becoming the president, Gbagbo imposed draconian measures to suppress dissent and heighten nationalist sentiment (Clark 2011). Soon after, violence engulfed the country. The regime survived a coup attempt in January 2001, and by September 2002, opposition forces—Forces Nouvelles—had seized control over much of the north of Côte d'Ivoire. Within a year, Gbagbo welcomed UN peacekeepers who quickly contained civil violence throughout Côte d'Ivoire. In 2010, however, after a disputed election, Gbagbo demanded the UN to leave. One of Gbagbo's close allies even warned that peacekeepers would be "treated as rebels" if they did not vacate the country (BBC 2010). How can we understand Gbagbo's initial enthusiasm for the UN involvement, given his ultimate reversal? More broadly, why do some regimes accept international forces while others do not?

In the three decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, international actors have become increasingly involved with warring parties in civil conflicts around the world (Krasner and Weinstein 2014; Howard and Stark 2017; Kreps 2011). International actions, such as peacekeeping, are not freely available or uniformly provided to any state facing instability. Some countries, despite security troubles, did not experience UN peacekeeping in their territories whereas other countries have hosted multiple peacekeeping operations. Since 1990, about 30 percent of countries in civil conflict—roughly 25 of 75—hosted UN peacekeepers.

Previous literature has argued that the UN tends to send peacekeepers to places with high instability (Fortna 2004), weak state militaries, and close links to the international community (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Despite many countries fulfilling these three criteria, since 2014, there have been no new peacekeeping operations. To understand the future of peacekeeping, we think it is important to return to this foundational question of where peacekeepers go. Informed by the literature on government interaction with active peacekeeping (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011; Duursma 2021) and the literature on regime survival (Chin et al. 2022; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), we explore the

demand side of peacekeeping, seeking to explain states' motivations to accept international actions in their sovereign territories.

Our central contention is that personalist regimes in civil conflict, particularly those with weak militaries, are more likely to accept peacekeepers because they reap greater *security benefits* and pay fewer *sovereignty costs* compared to other regime types experiencing civil conflict. Personalist regimes have a relatively greater need for the stability and security provided by peacekeepers. Personalist leaders face threats to their rule both from civil conflict and from a potential coup, leading to acute instability. This dual threat makes external security options highly appealing. The authority structure of personalist regimes also facilitates peacekeeping acceptance. One of the core features of personalist rule is centralized decision-making with few checks or balances (Weeks 2012). This decision-making structure enables the personalist leader to cede control over core state security functions without suffering severe backlash. This insulated decision-making environment may also empower the personalist to pinion or undermine the peacekeeping operation once it is active (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011; Duursma 2021). In this sense, personalists do not expect, *ex ante*, large sovereignty costs.

In contrast, leaders in non-personalist regimes, such as party-based authoritarian regimes or democracies, are less likely to accept international actions. These other regime types tend to be more internally stable, even during civil conflict, decreasing the anticipated security benefits of hosting peacekeepers. Furthermore, relatively more inclusive decision-making institutions in these regimes slow the policy-making process and create opportunities for elites or the public to oppose and impede costly policies. Given that the counterinsurgency itself may be a salient political issue, these non-personalist leaders will struggle to cede control over security to international actors and will be unlikely to accept a peacekeeping operation.

We test these theoretical expectations using data on personalist regimes and UN peacekeeping in a sample of regimes in civil conflict from 1990 to 2010. We find support for

our arguments: *ceteris paribus*, personalist regimes marred with instability, endowed with weak militaries, are more likely to accept UN peacekeepers than other regime types. Once personalists can manage a larger military, they become no more likely than other regimes to accept international actions.

Our theory and empirical evidence carry several implications. First, personalist regimes with strong militaries have and will continue to resist international actors in their internal conflicts.[1] Second, recent trends in international politics may amplify personalist leaders' incentives to jettison international actors. The retrenchment of multilateral efforts like UN peacekeeping coupled with increasing military assertiveness from Russia and China may shift the personalists' calculus, driving them to turn to alternatives like foreign military assistance, private military companies, or pro-government militias (Mehrl and Escribà-Folch 2024; Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2016). In the conclusion, we will discuss contributions and implications in more detail.

## 2 The Demand for Peacekeeping

Early literature on peacekeeping focused primarily on the UN's incentives to send peacekeepers to a given state, finding that UN peacekeeping tends to go to areas with the most intense conflict and greatest need (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). More recently, the literature on peacekeeping has shifted to consider the demand side of peacekeeping as it relates to peacekeeping's ultimate effectiveness. Work by Yuen (2020) highlights the ongoing, dynamic nature of state[2] consent for peacekeeping. Other work has followed up on this research, seeking to demonstrate how foreign aid can encourage and help sustain consent for intervention

[1] It is difficult to imagine that well-known personalists such as Putin, Chavez, or Erdoğan—as discussed in Baturo et al. (2024)—would accept international peacekeeping.

[2] Throughout this project, we will interchangeably refer to the government actor as the "state", "government", or "regime". Theoretically, this term refers to a regime as defined by Geddes, Wright, and Franz (2014): "a set of basic formal and informal rules for choosing leaders and policies" (313). For our purposes, this institution determines state security policy and would be charged with accepting a peacekeeping operation. Our theory does not require that the state be a unitary actor; we simply refer to this domestic decision-making institution as the "state" for ease of explication.

(Karreth, Passmore, and Tir 2024). This line of research generally argues that the host government's continued, positive consent for peacekeeping critically determines peacekeeping success. The fickle nature of peacekeeping consent begs the question of why governments allow peacekeepers in the first place, especially if there is only weak or temporary support for such international measures.

We argue that a state's decision to accept international peacekeepers hinges on a calculation of security benefits and sovereignty costs. Hosting an international peacekeeping operation (PKO) is fundamentally a tradeoff between sovereignty and security. Governments voluntarily cede control over domestic security to international actors in exchange for the strength and stability provided by an international peacekeeping force. The demand for peacekeeping is high when a leader expects large security benefits while anticipating small sovereignty costs. We contend that these dynamics are the most likely to obtain in personalist regimes.

## 2.1 Security Benefits: Personalists v. Others

Domestic threats have been the key impetus for UN peacekeeping.[3] States facing costly, destabilizing civil conflict can appeal to peacekeepers to effectively contain and curb continued violence. Peacekeeping operations significantly reduce state and rebel fatalities (Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2021) and protect civilian populations from predation (Fjelde, Hultman, and Nilsson 2019). The enhanced security from hosting peacekeepers may mitigate multiple potential grievances against the government, both from citizens and elites, bolstering the regime's stability (Piccolino and Karlsrud 2011; Carnegie and Mikulachek 2020).

Personalist regimes reap comparatively greater security benefits than other regime types. Strongman leaders in civil conflict face two competing threats to their position in power—being overthrown in a coup d'état or losing the civil war. Regardless of the shape of the threat, if personalists fall from power, "violent transitions are the norm" (Geddes, Wright,

[3]Since 1990, every deployed peacekeeping operation has followed some form of prolonged, widespread political violence.

and Frantz 2014a, 326). Personalist leaders and their associates regularly face exile, imprisonment, or death when they leave office, impelling them to hold on to power at all costs (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014a).

Given the high cost of losing office and the looming threat of being overthrown, personalists devote tremendous effort to coup-proofing their regime. In personalist regimes, political dissent is generally discouraged, and institutional mechanisms for expressing or resolving elite political disagreements are weak or nonexistent. Very often, the military is a disaffected political actor within personalist regimes, posing a significant coup risk to the leader. In order to survive and secure their grip on power, a personalist leader must deftly reshuffle and sideline potential opponents within the the military and government, removing their ability to coordinate and oust the leader (Chin et al. 2022).

The strongman's coup-proofing strategies produce multiple negative externalities that exacerbate the second major threat they face—a domestic rebellion. Reshuffling the military may help personalist leaders forestall an internal coup, but this process also renders state forces less effective against armed rebellions (Talmadge 2015; Escribà-Folch, Böhmelt, and Pilster 2020). Where state militaries are weak, civil violence can intensify and spread more easily, posing a greater threat to the regime and population. Unless the leader possesses an alternative force to the state military, the personalist is caught in a double-bind in which they rely on the military for security against rebels yet fear a military mutiny. Where personalists successfully weaken the military and avoid a coup, they face a much tougher fight against a domestic rebellion. Where personalists invest in military capability to address a rebellion, they leave themselves open to a coup.

Peacekeepers help personalists resolve this dilemma by directly managing the civil conflict, insulating the regime from one threat and freeing the personalist leader to focus on other dangers. In other words, peacekeeping provides strongmen an effective exit option in their political struggle with the military (Clark, Golder, and Golder 2017), enhancing the leader's bargaining power. Although peacekeeping operations do not explicitly aim to

prevent coups, they passively enable personalist leaders to secure their grip on power.

Other types of regimes like democracies or party regimes face a comparatively benign internal political situation. Broader access to decision-making and established procedures for managing political dissent reduces the chance that elite disagreements will trigger a coup. Without this internal threat, other regime types can more readily invest in military capabilities to address the insurgent threat. In this sense, other regime types gain security benefits solely in relation to their civil conflict. Peacekeeping offers fewer auxiliary benefits to democracies and non-personalist authoritarian regimes.

Conventional wisdom might lead one to think that strongman dictators would be highly unlikely to accept international intervention. Personalist leaders regularly tout a strong, independent image to discourage both domestic and interstate rivals from challenging the leader's rule. Accepting a PKO would clearly signal weakness. We have outlined, however, how the particular threat environment facing personalists increases their demand for international peacekeeping. Although all regime types reap some security benefits from peacekeeping, personalist leaders stand to gain comparatively more than others because peacekeeping can help them manage both internal (i.e. coups) and domestic threats (i.e. the civil war) simultaneously.

## 2.2 Sovereignty Costs: Personalists v. Others

By accepting a peacekeeping operation, states cede violent domestic authority to external actors, losing control over state security and staking their reputation by opening themselves up to increased international scrutiny.[4] The cost of intervention is sovereignty.

Peacekeeping operations fragment the state's monopoly on legitimate violence and shift the distribution of authority within domestic politics (Finnemore 2003). Peacekeepers assume many of the responsibilities of the state military and police—directly interceding in conflict areas to protect civilian populations from both organized political violence as well as

[4]See Hathaway (2008) for more on the concept of sovereignty costs in the context of international delegation.

predatory, criminal violence. Although state leaders can influence the contours of the PKO or raise concerns to the UN, they have little direct oversight over peacekeepers. Ultimately, peacekeepers answer to the UN, not the host government.

By relinquishing control over state security to peacekeepers and sacrificing policy flexibility, leaders who accept a PKO may generate downstream political consequences. The strength of the peacekeepers highlights the state's own inability to provide security, potentially eroding public support for the regime. Additionally, factions within the regime or among the domestic opposition may object to the peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping tends to freeze civil conflicts, providing both rebels and state forces a reprieve from active combat. The conduct of the counterinsurgency may, itself, be a hotly contested domestic issue. Even temporarily halting military operations against the insurgents may trigger a significant political backlash, especially if hardliners perceive the PKO as a concession to the rebels. Thus, even where initial support for a PKO is strong, this consensus may erode over time, leaving the regime vulnerable to intra-elite dissent and intense domestic criticism.

The above political consequences are rather moot for personalists. Personalist regimes generally lack safeguards or accountability mechanisms in the policy-making process. Strongman dictators can decide policy without building broad consensus or navigating many institutional constraints.[5] This exclusive decision-making system prevents opponents from voicing their concerns or impeding the policy process. Even after policy is decided, personalists rarely face accountability for poor decisions, further emboldening the strongman dictator to choose expedient policies (Billerbeck and Tansey 2019). The endemic instability in personalist regimes tends to shorten these leaders' time horizons, further contributing to the personalist's willingness to commit to myopic policies. This myopia may also contribute to personalists proclivity for restricting peacekeeper movements (Duursma 2021) or expelling peacekeepers (Melin and Kathman 2023).

In contrast, other regime types feature broader participation in the policy-making process.

[5]Personalists can also effectively offer side payments or other incentives to assuage potential concerns within their small ruling coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005).

Party regimes must account for differences of opinion within the party elite. Democracies feature a variety of mechanisms and institutions to ensure policy debate and opportunities for dissent. This inclusive policy process creates opportunities for opponents to obstruct and potentially halt unfavorable policies. Among these policies, a government's counterinsurgency strategy is likely a hotly contested political issue, subject to negotiation and compromise. In this security landscape, peacekeeping operations are long-term commitments. Given the greater number of stakeholders and their greater need for policy flexibility, non-personalist regimes would struggle to accept a peacekeeping operation. The sovereignty cost of hosting a PKO precludes them from accepting.

## 2.3 Expectations: Personalism and Peacekeeping

From the above discussion two testable hypotheses follow. The first hypothesis concerns the unconditional expectation that personalists are more likely than other regime types to accept a peacekeeping operation. Personalists tend to have weak, unreliable militaries and exclusive decision-making procedures, resulting in high security benefits and low sovereignty costs for strongman dictators. Other types of regimes are more internally stable and possess stronger militaries, reflecting lower security benefits and higher sovereignty costs. These key theorized differences underpin our first, unconditional hypothesis:

> ***H1:*** *Personalist regimes are more likely to accept UN peacekeeping than non-personalist regimes.*

Our theory also suggests that personalists *with small militaries* should be more likely to accept a PKO. One of the key mechanisms underlying personalists' proclivity for peacekeeping is their endemic military weakness. Personalists cannot invest in military capabilities during a civil war for fear that the military will overthrow the leader. But, if personalists can resolve this coup threat and empower a loyal military, they would not need peacekeeping's benefits. This leads to our second, conditional hypothesis:

***H2:*** *Personalist regimes with weaker militaries are more likely to accept UN peacekeeping than personalist regimes with stronger militaries.*

# 3 Empirical Analysis

We test our hypotheses about personalism and peacekeeping by gathering data on civil conflict, UN peacekeeping, and regime type between 1990 and 2010.[6] We build our sample using active civil conflict years as defined by UCDP (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008) plus two additional years. A country-year enters our sample when it achieves 25 civil conflict deaths in a given year. Observations fall out of the sample when there have been 24 consecutive months (two years) without a single battle-death. We expand beyond active civil conflict years to ensure that peacekeeping operations which follow a potentially protracted peace process remain in the sample.[7] This data construction process leads to 901 country-year observations from 1990 to 2010 across 72 countries and 117 regimes.

For the outcome variable, we use data on UN peacekeeping operations from 1990 to 2010. Our sample includes 22 peacekeeping operations which can be seen below in Table 1. In line with our interest in peacekeeping acceptance, we use this data to create a binary measure of peacekeeping onset. Since states cannot host two PKOs simultaneously, all country-conflict years with an active PKO are dropped from the sample—these observations are not at risk for another peacekeeping onset. Given this coding rule we are left with 816 observations in the country conflict-year sample.

We draw our primary independent variable—*Personalist*—from regime classifications from Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (GWF) (2014). Unlike other regime classification schemes, GWF code a rich variety of authoritarian systems including a category for personalist

[6]Peacekeeping and civil war data are available through 2020. Our timeframe is cut short due to limitations in the data on regime type from Geddes, Frantz, and Wright (2014).

[7]Given that PKOs are most often aimed at reducing violence within an ongoing civil conflict, restricting our sample to recently active civil conflicts provides the clearest risk set for our outcome—peacekeeping onset. Three PKOs are excluded from our sample because they occurred outside of active civil conflicts: Guatemala in 1999, Haiti in 1994, and Liberia in 1993.

Table 1: Regime Types and Peacekeeping

*Notes:* The PK Year column indicates the year that the UN peacekeeping operation began. Tenure reflects how long the regime had been in power at the time of PKO-acceptance. Table 1 shows that personalist regimes, especially nascent ones, are the most likely to accept a PKO.

| **Country** | **PK Year** | **GWF Regime** | **Tenure** |
|---|---|---|---|
| Indonesia | 2006 | Democracy | 7 |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | 1996 | Foreign-Occupied | 1 |
| El Salvador | 1992 | Indirect Military | 10 |
| Rwanda | 1993 | Military-Personal | 20 |
| Morocco | 1992 | Monarchy | 36 |
| Angola | 1992 | Party | 17 |
| Cambodia | 1992 | Party | 13 |
| Indonesia | 1999 | Party-Military-Personal | 33 |
| Serbia (Yugoslavia) | 1992 | Party-Personal | 1 |
| Serbia | 1999 | Party-Personal | 8 |
| Chad (and CAR) | 2007 | Personal | 17 |
| DR Congo (Zaire) | 1999 | Personal | 2 |
| Georgia | 1993 | Personal | 1 |
| Haiti | 2004 | Personal | 5 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 2003 | Personal | 3 |
| Liberia | 2003 | Personal | 6 |
| Sierra Leone | 1998 | Personal | 1 |
| Sudan | 2005 | Personal | 16 |
| Tajikistan | 1994 | Personal | 3 |
| Burundi | 2004 | Provisional | 1 |
| Somalia | 1992 | Warlord | 1 |
| Lebanon | 1992 | Warlord/Foreign-Occupied | 16 |

regimes. We utilize the "strict" personalism classification as our main explanatory variable. This coding excludes hybrid personalist regimes (i.e. military-personal, party-personal, etc.), yet better reflects our theoretical emphasis on high instability and concentrated decision-making power within personalist regimes.[8] Within our sample, roughly 21% of country-conflict years feature a personalist regime. Table A2 in the appendix breaks down the full analysis sample by regime type and whether the regime accepted a peacekeeping operation.

[8]Hybrid personalist regimes like military-personalists (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014b) or party-personalists (Levitsky and Way 2002) share decision-making power with a broader coalition of elites and tend to be more stable than "strict" personalist regimes (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Chin et al. 2022, 658). In Table A3 in the appendix, we replicate our primary models using the hybrid personalist classification as the independent variable, and the effect magnitude increases and maintains statistical significance.

The second key independent variable is an estimate of military size—*Military Personnel*—taken from the Correlates of War dataset (Singer 1988). We follow earlier work by Gilligan and Stedman (2003) and operationalize military weakness with the number of military personnel. During estimation, we log this variable to correct for its right skewness. States with fewer soldiers are less able to fight counterinsurgencies and provide stability broadly. Although a crude measure of raw military strength, this operationalization is closely aligned with the theoretical process by which personalists purge disloyal units in the military (Sudduth 2021, 876–877) and create parallel forces outside of the official military apparatus.

Finally, we collected a variety of variables to use for statistical control. Each of these variables may increase peacekeeping likelihood and are related to regime type and military size. First, we collect an estimate for the size of the country's total population—*Population*—as measured by Correlates of War (Singer 1988) and real GDP—*RGDP*— from the Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer 2015). Similarly to military size, the distributions of *Population* and *RGDP* are severely right-skewed, so we log both variables during estimation to improve model performance.

Additionally, we collect binary indicators for whether the country had proven oil reserves in a given year (Energy Institute 2024) (*Oil*) and whether the state was formerly the colony of a permanent member of the UN Security Council (*P5 Colony*) (Hadenius and Teorell 2007). Both of these variables, but *P5 Colony* in particular, capture the potential interests and attentiveness of the United Nations as part of the supply side considerations of the peacekeeping deployment.

Lastly, we collect two variables related to the civil conflict. First, we calculate a binary variable—*Inherited Conflict*—that denotes whether the civil conflict was ongoing when the regime came to power. We use this variable in our unconditional models to account for conflict dynamics without inducing post-treatment bias in our estimates. For our conditional models, we collect a measure of yearly battle deaths and lag it by one year. One of the strongest predictors of peacekeeping onset in the existing literature is contemporary conflict

severity (Gilligan and Stedman 2003), therefore it is important that we control for this alternative explanation in our model.

## 3.1 The Unconditional Effect of Personalism

Our first hypothesis posits that personalists, compared to all other regime types, are more likely to accept peacekeeping. Table 1 illustrates the plausibility of this claim: 9 out of 22 cases of peacekeeping between 1990 and 2010 started under personalist regimes. To test our expectation more systematically, we use matching. Personalism is not randomly distributed in our sample. Factors that influence whether a personalist leader rises to power in the first place may also influence the leader's likelihood to accept a PKO. By matching personalist and non-personalist regimes along a variety of pre-regime state characteristics, we can better isolate the effect of personalism itself on peacekeeping acceptance.

For matching, we aggregate our data from the country-conflict-year up to the regime. We include any regime that was in power for at least one conflict year as defined by our 24-month battle death rule. The raw sample includes 135 regimes, and 117 regimes are retained in the analysis after matching. Personalist regimes make up 23% of both samples.[9]

Our outcome variable—peacekeeping onset—is an indicator for whether the regime accepted peacekeeping at any point during its tenure. Since this outcome is infrequent (about 20 percent in the sample) and binary, we opt for full matching to preserve as many observations as possible and use the estimated weights to improve covariate balance.[10]

We match along six different pre-regime covariates: *Population*, *RGDP*, *Military Personnel*, *P5 Colony*, *Oil*, and *Inherited Conflict*. Each of these variables will influence the likelihood that a personalist regime takes power in a state and will also shift the baseline probability that any regime would accept peacekeeping upon taking power.

More populous and wealthier states are more difficult to govern, and therefore harder

[9]In the full sample, 31 of 135 regimes are personalist. In the analysis sample, 27 of 117 are personalist regimes.

[10]See Hansen (2004) for details on the fullmatch algorithm.

to establish personalized rule. The size of the military will also influence how easily a personalist leader can seize and accumulate power. Having been colonized also shapes the future institutional environment in the country. Groups empowered by the former colonial administration may seek to maintain these institutions to secure their privileged position whereas challengers may seek to overturn the colonial order. The ultimate shape of this political bargain will, by definition, determine whether a personalist leader comes to power and can consolidate control (Svolik 2012; Hale 2015; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Leber, Carothers, and Reichert 2023). Oil wealth has also been linked to greater personalism in authoritarian regimes since leaders can rely on these resources rather than turn to domestic taxation to maintain their position in power (Fails 2020). Finally, if a regime comes to power during an active conflict the pre-existing instability in the country provides clear opportunities for capture by personalist leaders.

To avoid post-treatment bias, *Military Personnel*, *RGDP*, *Population*, and *Oil* are measured in the year that the regime took power.[11] We also log-transform *Military Personnel*, *RGDP*, *Population* before matching to correct for their skewed distributions.

For selecting matches, we opt for a combination of nearest-neighbor and exact matching. We use nearest-neighbor matching for all continuous covariates—*Military Personnel*, *RGDP*, and *Population*—and exact matching for binary covariates—*P5 Colony*, *Oil*, and *Inherited Conflict*.

Matching significantly improved covariate balance in our sample. Balance improved across all individual covariates, and overall average distance was reduced by more than 50%. A love plot illustrating covariate balance in our matched sample can be seen in Figure A1 in the appendix.

With this matched sample in hand, we estimate two linear probability models with

[11]Ideally, to avoid all post-treatment bias, we would measure these variables in the year before the regime took power. But given our time period of 1990–2010, many states gained independence, preventing us from collecting a pre-regime measure of military size or GDP. Because these variables change very little from year to year, we chose to measure our variables in the year the regime took power in order to maximize our sample size and minimize post-treatment bias.

weights provided by matching: a bivariate regression of personalism and peacekeeping onset and a multivariate regression including all matched variables as controls. We estimate a linear probability model (LPM) because it imposes fewer functional form assumptions than alternatives like logit or probit regression. We also include covariates used in matching as controls to further improve precision, in line with best practices (Ho et al. 2011).

The LPM results in Table 2 shows that personalist regimes positively correlate with increased peacekeeping probability.[12] Based on the bivariate LPM results, personalist regimes, on average, accept peacekeeping 30% of the time whereas non-personalist regimes accept only 12% of the time. Personalists accept peacekeeping at twice the rate of other regimes. The effect size does not change when we include covariates. The only other covariate to reach weak statistical significance in the model is *P5 Colony*. The result suggests that P5 pet interests play very little role in guiding PKO deployment decisions.[13]

Taken together, the results of the unconditional models provide support for our first hypothesis. Personalist regimes are more likely to accept a peacekeeping operation than other regime types. In our theory, we argue that this effect obtains because personalist regimes have fewer constraints on their policy-making institutions. To illustrate the plausibility of this mechanism, we compile additional data on decision-making institutions in personalist and non-personalist regimes, drawing upon selectorate theory research by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2005; 2022). Selectorate theory emphasizes that only a portion of the population—the selectorate—participates in leader selection. In order to stay in power, leaders must maintain a critical mass of support from among this selectorate—the winning coalition. Thus, the size of the winning coalition can provide a measure of the leader's decision-making constraints. Personalists should have smaller winning coalitions, on average, than other regime types.

Figure 1 shows a kernel density plot of the winning coalition size among personalists and non-personalist regimes. The mode of personalist regimes falls to the left of non-personalist

[12] We estimate the same regressions on the unmatched sample and report these results in Table A4 in the appendix.

[13] Gilligan and Stedman (2003, 50) report similar results about P5 effects. See also the results in A3 and A5.

Table 2: Results of Regime Level LPMs in Matched Sample

Personalism positively correlates with an increase in peacekeeping likelihood.

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | Peacekeeping Onset Mached Sample | |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Personalist | 0.159* | 0.159* |
| | (0.122) | (0.122) |
| log(Military Personnel)† | | −0.036 |
| | | (0.052) |
| log(RGDP)† | | −0.088 |
| | | (0.070) |
| log(Population)† | | 0.144 |
| | | (0.115) |
| P5 Colony | | −0.284** |
| | | (0.129) |
| Oil† | | −0.048 |
| | | (0.099) |
| Inherited Conflict | | −0.114 |
| | | (0.106) |
| Constant | 0.174** | 0.085 |
| | (0.078) | (0.515) |
| Observations | 117 | 117 |
| Matching Weights | Y | Y |
| $R^2$ | 0.027 | 0.188 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.019 | 0.135 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.406 (df = 115) | 0.381 (df = 109) |
| F Statistic | 3.201** (df = 1; 115) | 3.595*** (df = 7; 109) |

*Notes:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Statistical significance reflects p-values from a one-tailed t-test.
†Variable measured in the year the regime takes power.
Standard errors are clustered on the matched groups.

Figure 1: Winning Coalition Size in Personalist and Non-Personalist Regimes




*Notes:* Personalist regimes in our sample tend to have smaller winning coalitions than other regime types. This suggests that these leaders have fewer checks on their decision-making authority.

regimes, with most mass to the left of this mode. While there is some overlap in winning coalition size between personalist and non-personalist regimes, in the aggregate, personalists tend to have smaller winning coalitions than non-personalists. This visual is consistent with our assertion that personalist regimes need to appease fewer constituencies to remain in power. This lack of constraint potentially bestows greater policy flexibility to personalist leaders, enabling them to more easily cede sovereignty to international actors.

## 3.2 The Conditional Effect

Recall that our second hypothesis concerns the effect of personalist regimes conditional on its military size. We expect that militarily weak personalists are more likely to accept peacekeeping compared to militarily strong personalists. In order to test this expectation, we use the full sample of country-conflict-years outlined previously in order to factor in the variation in the military size. This model thus evaluates the year-to-year probability that a regime accepts peacekeeping, rather than modeling whether a regime accepted peacekeeping at any time during its tenure. This change in unit of analysis is primarily due to the fact

that we are comparing across regimes in testing H1 while comparing across regime-years in testing H2. Just as in the previous section, we use a linear probability model. The primary independent variables in these models are regime type and military size—*Personalist* and *Military Personnel*. Given our conditional expectation, we interact regime type and military size.

For this interacted model, we include the same set of control variables that we used during matching with one exception. We substitute for *Inherited Conflict* with a lagged count of battle deaths (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008)—one of the most robust and strong predictors of peacekeeping onset (Gilligan and Stedman 2003). Including this covariate in our model closes the causal path from personalism to intense conflict to peacekeeping (Heger and Salehyan 2007), allowing us to isolate the effect of small military size and regime type on peacekeeping onset.

Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of peacekeeping onset in personalist and non-personalist regimes across different military sizes.[14] We plot predicted probabilities from one to seven on the log scale since the vast majority of militaries in our sample fall between these values.[15] As can be seen in the figure, personalist regimes with small militaries are much more likely to accept a peacekeeping operation than personalists with large militaries or other regime types with small militaries. As military size approaches around 150,000 soldiers (five on the log-scale), personalists appear no more likely to accept peacekeepers than non-personalist regimes. Personalists with very large militaries appear slightly less likely to accept peacekeepers compared to other regime types, however this comparison is weak as shown by the overlapping confidence intervals at the right tail of the graph. All in all, Figure 2 supports our expectation that peacekeeping is more likely among personalists with small militaries, compared to personalists with large militaries and other militarily weak

[14]The regression table with the coefficients for the interacted model can be seen in Table A5 in the appendix. For generating predicted probabilities, all continuous control variables are set to their means and binary variables are set to zero.

[15]A density plot of military size by regime type can be seen in Figure 3 in the following section.

Figure 2: Personalist and Non-Personalist Regimes Across Military Size




*Notes:* Military personnel is expressed in thousands of soldiers, then logged. Personalist regimes with weak militaries are more likely to accept peacekeeping compared to those with strong militaries. As military size increases, personalists become no more likely than other regime types to accept peacekeepers.

regime types.[16]

Our model results demonstrate that, when personalists have relatively smaller militaries, they are more likely to accept peacekeeping. Ultimately, our theory argues that personalist with weak militaries accept because of the greater anticipated security benefits. However, these model results do not reveal whether, in reality, personalists tend to have smaller militaries and therefore reap greater security benefits.

To illustrate this theorized mechanism, we present a kernel density plot of logged military personnel in personalist and non-personalist regimes. Figure 3 lends support to our theory. The mode of the personalist distribution is clearly to the left of the non-personalist regime, with most mass between two and four. Although there are some non-personalist regimes with comparably small militaries, many more non-personalist regimes tend to have larger

[16]To further demonstrate the robustness of our finding, we estimate two placebo models using democracies and military regimes as the primary independent variable, interacted with military size. These models are reported in Table A6 in the appendix. As expected, neither democracies or military regimes accept peacekeeping at a higher rate than other regime types.

Figure 3: Military Size of Personalist and Non-Personalist Regimes




*Notes:* In our sample of regimes in civil conflict, personalists tend to have smaller militaries than non-personalist regimes. Military personnel is expressed in thousands of soldiers, then logged. A value of 2 on the x-axis corresponds to roughly 7,000 soldiers; 4 corresponds to about 54,000 soldiers; 6 corresponds to 403,000 soldiers.

militaries than personalist regimes, with significant mass between four and six. Note that the x-axis is non-linear in this figure—logged values increase exponentially. Thus, the modal size of personalist militaries, roughly 2.5 on the log scale, corresponds to about 12,000 soldiers, whereas the modal size of non-personalist militaries (4.5 on the log scale) corresponds to more than 90,000 soldiers. The modal non-personalist military is nearly eight times larger than the modal personalist military. This visual further supports our proposition that personalists have greater need for peacekeeping's security benefits.

# 4 Conclusion

In this article, we have sought to explain peacekeeping demand for a logic of competing sovereignty costs and security benefits. States exchange domestic control for added security and stability. When security needs outweigh the cost of ceding sovereignty, states accept international peacekeeping. The logic suggests that personalist regimes, characterized by fewer checks on their decision-making authority and relatively smaller militaries, are more

likely to accept peacekeeping than other regimes. We find empirical support for our hypotheses. On average, personalist regimes are more likely than other regime types to accept a UN peacekeeping operation. Furthermore, we show that personalists *with small militaries* are the most likely to accept peacekeeping compared to personalist regimes with larger militaries and other regime types.

With the above findings, we return to the example of Laurent Gbagbo from the introduction. After surviving a military coup in 2001 and rapidly losing ground in the ensuing civil war, Gbagbo was prepared to pay high sovereignty costs in exchange for peacekeeping's security benefits. Between 2003 and 2010, however, Gbagbo was able to consolidate power and augment his security apparatus with various militias, including alleged "death squads" that targeted the forces of Alasane Ouattara, his political rival and challenger to the presidency (Lynch 2011; Bocchese 2019). Given this internal consolidation, by 2010, Gbagbo's primary threat had shifted and the costs of continuing the PKO outpaced the benefits.[17] Gbagbo likely understood that, in order to survive after losing his reelection bid, he needed to decisively quash regime opponents. Peacekeepers obstructed this goal. The costs of ceding sovereignty over security to the UN in 2004 were low. In 2010, in contrast, such sovereignty costs well exceed expected security gains for Gbagbo. When he needed to reclaim this sovereignty, it was too late to save his regime.

Our finding has important implications for both scholarly and policy debates. First, we have provided new arguments about peacekeeping onset and personalist regimes' motivations to work with international actors. By emphasizing the demand-side of UN peacekeeping, we have sought to advance scholarly debate on the fundamental question of where peacekeepers go. The political calculus of security benefits and sovereignty costs can be a useful framework to understand when states might delegate other sovereign functions to external actors.

Our empirical findings also hint at the idea that personalist regimes might take advantage of international intervention to secure their grip on power—using peacekeepers instrumen-

[17]It is instructive to note that, in Gbagbo's trial at the International Criminal Court, he was heavily criticized for using peacekeeping instrumentally to prop up his rule.

tally to sideline internal political opponents. While peacekeeping may promote stability and security, leaders may use peacekeepers to pursue illiberal goals nonetheless. Future work should further consider this logic and examine how different regimes choose to cooperate with and/ or undermine the ultimate goals of peacekeeping and other international actions.

In the policy arena, recent trends in international politics seem to indicate that personalists' proclivity for UN peacekeeping may be waning. Alternatives like foreign military assistance, private military companies (Mehrl and Escribà-Folch 2024), or pro-government militias (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2016; Klosek and Souleimanov 2025) have proliferated and gained wider acceptance in the past decade. The security situation in the Central African Republic provides an illustrative case. In recent years, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has lost popularity, and President Touadera has turned to alternatives from Russia, namely the Wagner Group, to provide military training and assistance and enhance domestic security. Before alternatives like the Wagner Group, these states had to rely on UN peacekeepers despite the associated costs. However, Russia's renewed international assertiveness provides an opportunity for states to obtain security benefits while retaining complete control over domestic security.

Lastly, our project speaks to the present and future trends in international peacekeeping effectiveness. If personalists accept peacekeepers as an expedient solution to their dual coup-conflict threat, then this dynamic may shape the ultimate success of the peacekeeping operation and prospects for democratic reform in these countries.[18] As the world experiences retrenchment and backlash against peacekeeping and multilateral measures more generally (Duursma et al. 2023; Karlsrud 2023), understanding the answer to why states accept international actions sheds light on why states reject them at other times.

[18]See recent research from Blair et al. (2023) that links peacekeeping with democratization.

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# A Online Appendix

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics

The following table displays descriptive statistics for the sample of regimes used in the analysis. We take the average value of all continuous covariates across all years of a regime. The metrics reflect the minimum, mean, median, etc. of these regime averages.

| | N. Obs | Min. | Mean | Median | Max. | SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Personalist** | 135 | 0 | 0.230 | 0 | 1 | 0.422 |
| **log(Military Personnel)** | 130 | 0.000 | 3.555 | 3.434 | 8.007 | 1.576 |
| **log(RGDP)** | 118 | 7.164 | 10.224 | 10.086 | 14.948 | 1.779 |
| **log(Population)** | 130 | 6.661 | 9.319 | 9.054 | 13.249 | 1.329 |
| **P5 Colony** | 135 | 0 | 0.422 | 0 | 1 | 0.496 |
| **Oil** | 135 | 0 | 0.296 | 0 | 1 | 0.458 |
| **Inherited Conflict** | 131 | 0 | 0.550 | 1 | 1 | 0.499 |

Table A2: Regimes in Our Sample

**PK Acceptors**

| Personalist Regimes | | | | Non-Personalist Regimes | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Country* | *Leader* | *Regime Yrs* | *PK Yr* | *Country* | *Regime Type* | *Regime Yrs* | *PK Yr* |
| Chad | Deby | 1991-2010 | 2007 | Angola | Party | 1989-2010 | 1992 |
| DR Congo | Kabila | 1998-2010 | 1999 | Bosnia-Herzegovina | Foreign-Occupied | 1996-1997 | 1996 |
| Georgia | Shevardnadze | 1993-1995 | 1993 | Burundi | Provisional | 2004-2005 | 2004 |
| Haiti | Aristide† | 2004 | 2004 | Cambodia | Party | 1989-2000 | 1992 |
| Ivory Coast | Gbagbo | 2002-2010 | 2003 | El Salvador | Indirect Military | 1989-1994 | 1992 |
| Liberia | Charles Taylor† | 2000-2003 | 2003 | Indonesia | Party-Mil.-Personal | 1990-1999 | 1999 |
| Sierra Leone | Koroma (RUF)† | 1998 | 1998 | Indonesia | Democracy | 2000-2010 | 2006 |
| Sudan | Al-Bashir | 1990-2010 | 2005 | Lebanon | Warlord/ Occupied | 1989-1992 | 1992 |
| Tajikistan | Rahmon | 1992-2010 | 1994 | Morocco | Monarchy | 1989-1993 | 1992 |
| | | | | Rwanda | Military-Personal | 1990-1994 | 1993 |
| | | | | Serbia (Yugoslavia) | Party-Personal | 1992-2000 | 1992 |
| | | | | Somalia | Warlord | 1992-2010 | 1992 |

**No Peacekeeping**

| *Country* | *Regime Yrs* | *Country* | *Yrs* | *Country* | *Yrs* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | 2010 | Afghanistan | 1989-2009 | Myanmar | 1989-2010 |
| Azerbaijan | 1992-2010 | Algeria | 1991-2010 | Nepal | 1996-2010 |
| Bangladesh | 1989-1990 | Bangladesh | 1991-2010 | Nicaragua | 1989-1992 |
| CAR§ | 2004-2010 | Bosnia-Herzegovina* | 1993-1995 | Niger | 1991-2010 |
| Chad* | 1989-1990 | Burundi* | 1991-2003; 2005-2010 | Nigeria | 2004-2010 |
| Congo | 1998-2009 | CAR† | 2001-2003 | North Macedonia | 2001-2003 |
| DR Congo* | 1996-1997 | China | 2008-2010 | Pakistan | 1990-2010 |
| Georgia* | 1992 | Colombia | 1989-2010 | Panama | 1989-1991 |
| Guinea | 2000-2003 | Congo | 1993-1997 | Paraguay | 1989-1991 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1998-1999 | Egypt | 1993-2002 | Peru | 1989-2010 |
| Iraq | 1989-1998 | Eritrea | 1997-2005 | Philippines | 1989-2010 |
| Liberia | 1989-1990 | Ethiopia | 1989-2010 | Romania | 1989-1991 |
| Mali‡ | 1990-1991 | Georgia* | 2004-2010 | Russia | 1990-1993 |
| Mauritania | 2010 | Guatemala | 1989-1998 | Rwanda* | 1995-2010 |
| Niger | 1997-1999 | Guinea-Bissau | 2000-2001 | Senegal | 1990-2010 |
| Peru | 1993-2000 | Haiti* | 1989-2003; 2005-2006 | Serbia (Yugoslavia)* | 2001 |
| Russia | 1994-2010 | India | 1989-2010 | Sierra Leone* | 1991-2003 |
| Somalia* | 1989-1991 | Iran | 1990-2010 | Spain | 1991-2010 |
| Uganda | 1989-2010 | Iraq | 2004-2010 | Sri Lanka | 1989-2010 |
| Yemen | 1994-2010 | Israel | 1989-2010 | Sudan* | 1989 |
| | | Laos | 1989-2002 | Thailand | 2003-2010 |
| | | Lesotho | 1998-2000 | Turkey | 1989-2010 |
| | | Liberia* | 1991-1999; 2004-2005 | UK | 1989-2010 |
| | | Mali‡ | 1992-2010 | USA | 2001-2010 |
| | | Mexico | 1994-2000 | Uzbekistan | 1999-2010 |
| | | Moldova | 1992-1994 | Venezuela | 1992-1994 |
| | | Mozambique | 1989-2007 | | |

*These countries accepted peacekeeping at some other point in their conflict.

†These personalist leaders were ousted, and peacekeeping followed shortly thereafter.

§The Central African Republic eventually hosted a peacekeeping operation in 2014; however, Bozize did not accept the PKO. The mission was established as part of a large multilateral intervention removing president Djotodia.

‡Mali eventually hosted a peacekeeping operation in 2013 after a long rebellion and a military coup.

Figure A1: Balance Plot for Matched Regime Sample

Balance improves overall and within each individual covariate. Absolute standard mean difference decreased by more than half.



Table A3: Results of Regime Level LPMs with Hybrid Personalist Coding, Matched Sample

As a robustness check, we expanded the coding rule from strict personalist regimes to include all hybrid personalist regimes. We create a new matched dataset along hybrid personalist regimes using the same covariates and then estimate linear probability models. The coefficients increase and standard errors decrease in the specification using hybrid personalist regimes, demonstrating the robustness of our evidence. Table A6 includes an interacted country-year model specification using hybrid personalists instead of strict personalists.

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | Peacekeeping Onset Matched Sample | |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Hybrid Personalist | 0.168** | 0.171** |
| | (0.090) | (0.089) |
| log(Military Personnel)† | | −0.007 |
| | | (0.053) |
| log(RGDP)† | | −0.080** |
| | | (0.046) |
| log(Population)† | | 0.130** |
| | | (0.071) |
| P5 Colony | | −0.060 |
| | | (0.081) |
| Oil† | | −0.063 |
| | | (0.099) |
| Inherited Conflict | | −0.083 |
| | | (0.089) |
| Constant | 0.132** | −0.155 |
| | (0.059) | (0.428) |
| Observations | 117 | 117 |
| $R^2$ | 0.041 | 0.100 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.033 | 0.042 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.387 (df = 115) | 0.385 (df = 109) |
| F Statistic | 4.971** (df = 1; 115) | 1.734* (df = 7; 109) |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Statistical significance reflects p-values from a one-tailed t-test.
†Variable measured in the year the regime takes power.
Standard errors are clustered on the matched groups.

Table A4: Results of Regime Level LPMs in Unmatched Sample

As a robustness check, we estimate our regime-level models on an unmatched sample of regimes. All core results hold.

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | Peacekeeping Onset Unmatched Sample | |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Personalist | 0.175** | 0.219*** |
| | (0.082) | (0.085) |
| log(Military Personnel)† | | −0.022 |
| | | (0.047) |
| log(RGDP)† | | −0.043 |
| | | (0.042) |
| log(Population)† | | 0.084 |
| | | (0.081) |
| P5 Colony | | −0.117* |
| | | (0.088) |
| Oil† | | −0.018 |
| | | (0.092) |
| Inherited Conflict | | −0.062 |
| | | (0.072) |
| Constant | 0.115*** | −0.049 |
| | (0.034) | (0.430) |
| Observations | 135 | 117 |
| $R^2$ | 0.041 | 0.087 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.034 | 0.029 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.358 (df = 133) | 0.373 (df = 109) |
| F Statistic | 5.717*** (df = 1; 133) | 1.490* (df = 7; 109) |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Statistical significance reflects p-values from a one-tailed t-test.
†Variable measured in the year the regime takes power.
Standard errors are clustered on the country.

Table A5: Results of Country-Year Level LPMs with Interactions

Personalist regimes with relatively smaller militaries are more likely to host a peacekeeping operation. As a personalist's military increases in size, they become no more likely to accept peacekeeping than non-personalists.

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Peacekeeping Onset | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Personalist | 0.030 | 0.029 | 0.151** |
| | (0.019) | (0.022) | (0.064) |
| log(Military Personnel) | | −0.008 | 0.002 |
| | | (0.012) | (0.011) |
| log(Battle deaths) L1 | | 0.008*** | 0.008*** |
| | | (0.003) | (0.003) |
| log(RGDP) | | −0.003 | −0.003 |
| | | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| log(Population) | | 0.0004 | −0.003 |
| | | (0.013) | (0.014) |
| P5 Colony | | −0.032* | −0.034* |
| | | (0.018) | (0.017) |
| Oil | | −0.020 | −0.018 |
| | | (0.018) | (0.018) |
| Personalist × | | | −0.029** |
| log(Military Personnel) | | | (0.012) |
| Constant | 0.022*** | 0.074 | 0.063 |
| | (0.007) | (0.079) | (0.079) |
| Observations | 816 | 684 | 684 |
| $R^2$ | 0.005 | 0.033 | 0.045 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.004 | 0.023 | 0.034 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.165 | 0.167 | 0.166 |
| F Statistic | 4.487** | 3.345*** | 3.988*** |
| *Note:* | | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |
| | | | SEs clustered on country. |

Table A6: Results of Country-Year Level LPMs with Placebo

This table presents placebo models that interact other regime types with military size. The first column uses democracies, and the second uses military regimes. The final column expands our "strict" personalism category to all hybrid personalist regimes, too. Results align with our theoretical expectations. Democracies are highly unlikely to accept a peacekeeping operation, only approaching other regimes' acceptance rate at the highest levels of military size. Military regimes, similarly, have no special proclivity for peacekeeping acceptance at any level of military size. When we include hybrid personalist regimes, the main effect weakens slightly, but maintains statistical significance, demonstrating the robustness of our findings.

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Peacekeeping Onset | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Democracy | −0.101*** | | |
| | (0.036) | | |
| Military | | −0.015 | |
| | | (0.092) | |
| Hybrid Personalist | | | 0.114** |
| | | | (0.049) |
| log(Military Personnel) | −0.018 | −0.007 | −0.0005 |
| | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.011) |
| log(Battle Deaths) L1 | 0.008** | 0.009** | 0.008** |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) |
| Democracy × log(Mil. Per.) | 0.012* | | |
| | (0.007) | | |
| Military × log(Mil. Per.) | | 0.001 | |
| | | (0.016) | |
| Hybrid Personalist × log(Mil. Per.) | | | −0.016* |
| | | | (0.009) |
| Constant | 0.092 | 0.103 | 0.049 |
| | (0.077) | (0.072) | (0.090) |
| Observations | 672 | 684 | 672 |
| Controls | Y | Y | Y |
| $R^2$ | 0.046 | 0.030 | 0.045 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.034 | 0.018 | 0.034 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.167 | 0.167 | 0.167 |
| F Statistic | 3.957*** | 2.583*** | 3.910*** |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
SEs clustered on country.
Controls include *log(RGDP), log(Population), P5 Colony,* and *Oil.*